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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 920099-CA 
v. : 
RICHARD M. GURULE, : Priority No. 10 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Richard M. Gurule appeals from an 
interlocutory trial court order permitting, in part, admission of 
eyewitness identification testimony in a prosecution for 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-103 (1990). The order was entered by the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, presiding. 
This Court granted defendant's petition for 
interlocutory review on March 26, 1992 (order copied at Addendum 
A to Br. of Appellant). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issue presented by defendant will be addressed in 
this brief under two points: 
1. Did the trial court correctly rule that eyewitness 
identification testimony, based upon events witnessed prior to an 
illegal police search and "showup," is sufficiently reliable to 
be heard at defendant's trial? In reviewing a decision to admit 
eyewitness identification testimony, the trial court's findings 
of underlying fact are reviewed deferentially for clear error. 
However, "whether these facts are sufficient to demonstrate 
reliability [of an eyewitness identification] is a question of 
law, which [appellate courts] review for correctness." State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991). As set forth in the body 
of this brief, this latter statement actually allows for some 
deference to the trial court's ruling. See id. at 784. 
2. Did the trial court correctly rule that the 
eyewitness identification testimony is not the "tainted fruit" of 
the subsequent illegal search, and is therefore admissible? The 
Utah Supreme Court reviews the question of whether evidence is 
tainted by prior police misconduct nondeferentially, as a matter 
of law. State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 26 (Utah 
January 7, 1993). However, as set forth more fully in the body 
of this brief, the question of whether eyewitness testimony might 
be tainted by subsequent police misconduct is largely a question 
of fact, reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Crews, 
445 U.S. 463, 473, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 1251 (1980). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The first point on appeal implicates Article I, section 
7 of the Utah Constitution, which states: "No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law." The second point implicates the scope of the exclusionary 
rule as a remedy for police violation of the fourth amendment, 
2 
"unreasonable searches and seizures" provision of the United 
States Constitution. Both constitutional provisions are set 
forth in Addendum B to the Brief of Appellant. Other pertinent 
constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules will be set forth 
as necessary in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant, defendant now 
stands charged with one count of aggravated assault (R. 3, 6-
7J.1 Defendant moved to suppress all eyewitness trial testimony 
identifying him as the assailant, and to suppress all evidence 
acquired as the result of an illegal police search of his home 
(R. 20, 25, copied at Addendum C to Br. of Appellant). 
The trial court agreed that police, investigating the 
assault, had illegally entered and searched defendant's home (R. 
35; trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, R. 32-
36, are copied at Addendum E to Br. of Appellant). Accordingly, 
all evidence acquired after that search, including a "showup" 
identification of defendant, was ordered suppressed (R. 35). The 
trial court also ruled that the showup had been conducted under 
"suggestive circumstances" (R. 36). 
Upon the State's objection, and upon subsequent 
argument and memoranda (R. 37-39, 42-59), the trial court 
clarified its order suppressing evidence. The court specifically 
ruled that "eyewitness identification evidence obtained prior to 
Citations to the main record are designated R. 1-146; 
transcript citations are R. 147-367 (large volume of one hearing), 
and R. 368-78 (small volume covering two hearings). 
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the illegal search and seizure may properly be offered and 
admitted if otherwise competent, and is not to be suppressed as 
part of the Court's prior order ..." (R. 130; supplemental 
findings and conclusions, R. 128-31, copied at Addendum G to Br. 
of Appellant). Defendant appeals from this ruling, arguing that 
all eyewitness identification testimony must be suppressed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant is charged with aggravated assault upon Dale 
Haddenham, who was a guest of the Knowlden family, in West Valley 
City, one night in May, 1990 (R. 6, 173, 225). The most critical 
facts pertinent to this appeal involve the events surrounding the 
assault, but prior to the improper search and the ensuing showup. 
Those facts are as follows: 
On the night in question, the Knowlden family, Dale 
Haddenham, and other friends were having a small party (R. 155, 
173, 224-25). Eddy Knowlden, Rodney Knowlden, Jody Knowlden, 
Haddenham, and the other guests were watching television when "a 
bunch of strangers" appeared inside the Knowlden home (R. 17 3, 
225). One of these intruders announced, "We are here to party or 
trash the place, it's your choice" (R. 174). After a brief 
exchange of unpleasantries, the intruders retreated (R. 175, 
226). The retreat was tumultuous: Dorothy Knowlden, who had 
been surprised in her kitchen by one intruder—a "small boy," was 
knocked down in the process (R. 156, 158, 165). 
On the "spur of the moment," Dale Haddenham, Rodney 
Knowlden, and Eddy Knowlden pursued the intruders (R. 175, 227-
4 
28)• Jody Knowlden paused to assist Dorothy Knowlden, then 
apparently joined the pursuit (R. 158). 
Dale Haddenham led the pursuit. Rodney Knowlden, close 
behind, saw a man step from behind a truck parked in the Knowlden 
driveway. The man hit Haddenham in the head with a baseball bat, 
knocking him "clear off his feet," and breaking the bat (R. 228-
29). Eddy Knowlden did not witness the exact instant of the 
blow, for he was momentarily distracted by another stranger 
emerging from behind a tree (R. 177-78). However, he did see 
Haddenham fall to the ground, saw "something flying through the 
air," and saw Haddenhamfs assailant holding the apparent bat 
handle (R. 180, 193-94). The record does not reveal what Jody 
Knowlden saw, for he did not testify at the hearing of the motion 
to suppress.2 It appears that Jody Knowlden, if he witnessed 
the attack, did so from a greater distance than did Rodney and 
Eddy Knowlden (R. 45, 148, 362). 
Although it was well past sunset, the scene was 
illuminated by several lights (R. 168-69, 180, 229). Rodney 
Knowlden viewed the assailant face to face, at a distance of 
about eleven feet, for "approximately seven, eight seconds" 
immediately after Haddenham fell (R. 229-30). He could see that 
the assailant had blood spatters on his shirt; indeed, Rodney 
himself was spattered with Haddenham's blood (R. 238). Rodney, 
defendant has not incorporated the preliminary hearing 
transcript, which might describe Jody Knowlden's testimony, into 
the record on appeal. Haddenham apparently never saw, or could not 
remember, his assailant. An investigating officer later found 
"half of a bat" at the scene (R. 267). 
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who stated that he has "perfect" eyesight, described the 
assailant as "about five foot six, heavy-set, hundred eighty, 
hundred ninety pounds, black hair. He had a black kind of a 
beard right here on his chin, just a strip of hair" (R. 230-31), 
Rodney Knowlden also filled out a written witness 
statement on the night of the assault, describing Haddenham's 
assailant as "a [M]exican male, approx[i]mately, 5'6" tall 200 
lbs. . . . He had a small beard on the end of his chin" 
(Defendant's exhibit 6, admitted at R. 249-50, copied at Appendix 
I of this brief). At the hearing on defendant's motion to 
suppress, Rodney Knowlden unequivocally testified that he filled 
out his witness statement before identifying defendant, at the 
showup, as Haddenham's assailant (R. 234). The lead 
investigating officer also testified that witness statements were 
sought before the showup (R. 280). 
Eddy Knowlden reported that "[e]verybody just stopped" 
moving for "[m]aybe ten seconds" after Haddenham was bludgeoned 
(R. 182, 205-06). Haddenham, he saw, was "just covered with 
blood" (R. 180). Eddy, who is nearsighted and was not wearing 
his corrective lenses at the time, described the assailant as a 
"kid" who was "short and stocky" (R. 182-83, 186). He viewed the 
assailant from an uncertain distance, in the range of six to 
thirteen feet (R. 179, 239). Again, the present record does not 
reveal just what Jody Knowlden saw. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The pre-search, pre-showup identification of Dale 
Haddenham's assailant is sufficiently reliable for admission 
under Utah's state constitution-based criteria. Compared to 
State v. Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court's leading case on point, 
the eyewitnesses here had a far better opportunity to accurately 
observe and describe the assailant. Because the identification 
testimony in Ramirez was held sufficiently reliable to be 
admitted, the more reliable testimony here is surely admissible 
as well. 
The eyewitness identification testimony was not 
"tainted" by the police misconduct that occurred subsequent to 
the assault. Defendant's "retroactive taint" theory does have 
support in federal case dictum. However, that theory should not 
compel suppression here, for the record demonstrates that the 
eyewitness testimony in issue is founded upon observations that 
were independent of the subsequent police misconduct. 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT: ISSUE CLARIFICATION 
Nature of the Appealed-from Ruling 
To resolve this appeal, it is first necessary to 
confirm the nature of the trial court's evidentiary ruling. 
Defendant states: "[T]he trial judge's ruling appears to 
preclude an in-court identification but allow a pre-seizure 
description" of him (Br. of Appellant at 17). To the contrary, 
the appealed-from ruling is not so favorable to defendant. 
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The ruling simply states: "[T]he eyewitness 
identification evidence obtained prior to the illegal search and 
seizure may properly be offered and admitted if otherwise 
competent, and is not to be suppressed as part of the Court's 
prior order dated May 8, 1991" (Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, at R. 130, copied in Addendum G to Br. of 
Appellant). This ruling contains no indication that the trial 
court intends to prohibit the State's competent eyewitnesses from 
pointing out defendant, to the trial jury, as the person who 
bludgeoned Dale Haddenham. 
Nor does anything else in the record support 
defendant's assertion that only the pre-search, pre-showup 
description of Haddenham's assailant may be received. In fact, 
during argument of the State's request to allow pre-search 
identification testimony, the trial court expressed a contrary 
intention: "I will make it as clear as I can on the record that 
I have no intention of suppressing any evidence, identification 
evidence based upon events that occurred prior to the search" (R. 
370, emphasis added). This shows an intention to allow all pre-
search eyewitness identification testimony that is competent 
under Rules 601 and 602, Utah Rules of Evidence, and Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-24-1 and -2 (1992). The court's written ruling thus 
contemplates that the State's witnesses, provided they establish 
personal knowledge under Rule 602, will be allowed to point out 
defendant, at trial, as Haddenham's assailant. 
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Certainly, as a form of alternative relief, defendant 
might ask this Court to reverse the foregoing ruling in part, 
barring the State's witnesses from specifically identifying him 
at trial, yet allowing them to describe Haddenham's assailant as 
he appeared in the immediate aftermath of the assault. However, 
defendant ought not be allowed to indirectly carve away the trial 
court's ruling, by imposing, upon the State and this Court, his 
own notion of what that ruling "appears" to mean. 
On appeal, then, the State treats the trial court's 
ruling as allowing in-court identification of defendant, so long 
as such identification is based upon events actually observed by 
the State's witnesses, and that occurred before the improper 
search, and before the "suggestive" showup. That ruling should 
be affirmed. 
The Eyewitness Testimony in Issue 
Defendant first argues that Dorothy Knowlden cannot 
give eyewitness identification testimony (Br. of Appellant at 18-
21). Although Mrs. Knowlden was arguably assaulted during the 
fracas at her home, defendant is not charged with assaulting her; 
again, he is only charged with assaulting Dale Haddenham (R. 6). 
At trial, the State will not call Mrs. Knowlden to identify 
defendant as Dale Haddenham's assailant. 
Mrs. Knowlden only saw the -small boy" who entered her 
kitchen, and about six other intruders (R. 156-57, 165). She did 
not witness the assault on Haddenham, for she was knocked down 
inside the home as the intruders fled. By the time she looked 
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outside, Haddenham had already been attacked, and was being 
assisted by Rodney, Eddy, and Jody Knowlden (R. 158). Thus even 
though Mrs, Knowlden professed to remember a person with "a small 
goatee" as having somehow been involved (R. 166), she cannot 
identify that person as Haddenham's assailant. 
At trial, the State will call Mrs. Knowlden to describe 
the intrusion that preceded the assault on Haddenham. She also 
has useful testimony to give regarding the lighting conditions in 
the area of the assault, and in placing Rodney, Eddy, and Jody 
Knowlden within view of the assault (R. 158, 168-69). However, 
because she did not witness the assault itself, she is not 
competent to describe Haddenham's assailant. See Utah R. Evid. 
602 (personal knowledge of matter in issue required). Therefore, 
consistent with the trial court's ruling, Mrs. Knowlden will not 
be asked to identify defendant as the assailant. 
As stated in its memorandum to the trial court, the 
State does wish to elicit eyewitness identification testimony 
from Rodney, Eddy, and Jody Knowlden (R. 45). As already set 
forth, Rodney and Eddy Knowlden witnessed the assault on 
Haddenham from rather close range. Jody Knowlden evidently 
viewed the assault from a longer distance, because he stopped to 
assist Dorothy Knowlden before joining Rodney and Eddy in pursuit 
of the intruders (R. 45, 148, 362). 
It remains incumbent upon the State to lay the full 
foundation for admission of Jody Knowlden's testimony at trial. 
Jody apparently testified at the preliminary hearing of this case 
10 
(R. 362). However, defendant has not incorporated the transcript 
of that hearing into the record on appeal. Thus neither this 
Court nor the State's appellate counsel can now fully review 
whether Jody Knowlden's identification testimony is admissible. 
In this brief, then, the State will focus upon the 
eyewitness identification testimony of Rodney and Eddy Knowlden. 
The trial court's ruling admitting that testimony should be 
affirmed. The State will comment briefly upon the possible 
admissibility of Jody Knowlden's testimony. That question will 
have to be fully addressed when this case, still in pretrial 
posture, returns to the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY IS 
SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE TO BE HEARD AT TRIAL. 
Defendant assails the testimony of Rodney, Eddy, and 
Jody Knowlden as unreliable, under State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 
(Utah 1991). In Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court established 
reliability standards for admission of eyewitness identification 
testimony under the Utah Constitution's "due process" clause, 
Article I, section 7. Those standards meet, and probably exceed, 
existing federal reliability standards. 817 P.2d at 780, 784. 
Ramirez established a five-factor inquiry for 
eyewitness reliability, and admissibility of eyewitness 
identification testimony. The factors are: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view 
the actor during the event; (2) the witness's 
11 
degree of attention to the actor at the time 
of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to 
observe the event, including his or her 
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the 
witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event 
being observed and the likelihood that the 
witness would perceive, remember and relate 
it correctly. This last area includes such 
factors as whether the event was an ordinary 
one in the mind of the observer during the 
time it was observed, and whether the race of 
the actor was the same as the observer's. 
817 P.2d at 781. This inquiry is derived from a precautionary 
jury instruction established in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 
(Utah 1986) . 
A. Appellate Review Under Ramirez. 
Making the foregoing reliability inquiry, the Ramirez 
court actually affirmed a trial court's decision, characterized 
as "an extremely close case," 817 P.2d at 784, to allow 
eyewitness identification testimony against a reliability 
challenge.3 It did so after "considering the facts in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's decision and giving due 
deference to the trial judge's ability to appraise demeanor 
evidence," id., at 784. Therefore, even though purporting to 
review the trial court's reliability decision nondeferentially, 
id. at 782, it is evident that the supreme court gave at least 
some deference to the trial court's decision. This appears 
Ultimately, the admission of that testimony was reversed, 
upon the distinctive ground that the trial court had failed to 
determine whether the testimony was the inadmissible "fruit" of an 
illegal detention. Id., at 788-89. That ground, also advanced 
here, is addressed in Point Two of this brief. 
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appropriate, given that a trial court's eyewitness reliability 
ruling is necessarily a "judgment call." ££.. State v. 
Richardson, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 45-46 (Utah App. December 10, 
1992) (Bench, P.J., concurring). 
It should also be borne in mind that the Ramirez 
admissibility inquiry is a "gatekeeping" decision. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 778. While the inquiry is important, having 
constitutional dimension, see id. / it is also provisional, and 
does not constitute the final word on the reliability of 
eyewitness testimony. That determination belongs to the trial 
jury, as instructed under Long. The fact that the threshold 
decision to admit eyewitness testimony is provisional also weighs 
against overly intrusive appellate review, particularly on an 
interlocutory basis. 
Defendant implies that the State carries the burden, on 
appeal, of establishing the reliability of the proffered 
eyewitness identification testiomony here (e.g., Br. of Appellant 
at 23: "[T]he State cannot sustain its burden . . . " ) . Ramirez 
teaches that the State must shoulder the admissibility burden in 
the trial court. 817 P.2d at 778. However, the trial court's 
decision to admit the testimony here amounts to a judgment that 
the State did sustain its burden. On appeal, that judgment 
deserves a presumption of correctness. According to State v. 
*But see State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah 1989) ("We 
decided Long [which underpins Ramirez! on neither federal nor state 
constitutional principles, but rather as a result of our 
supervisory capacity over the lower courts"). 
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Jones, 657 P. 2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982), the burden of overcoming 
that presumption, whatever the standard of appellate review may 
be, rests upon defendant. 
Bearing the foregoing principles in mind, the trial 
court's decision to admit the challenged eyewitness 
identification testimony should be affirmed under the Ramirez 
five-factor inquiry. As follows, affirmance is especially proper 
when the facts here are compared to those in Ramirez. 
B. Rodney Knowlden's Testimony. 
(1) Opportunity to View. 
Turning to the first Ramirez factor, defendant 
acknowledges that Rodney Knowlden saw the assailant strike 
Haddenham, and stared at the assailant face to face, from about 
eleven feet away, in an illuminated area, for about seven or 
eight seconds (Br. of Appellant at 25).5 His "suggestion" (id.) 
that Rodney had a poor opportunity to view the assailant is 
therefore implausible. Rodney's opportunity was obviously better 
than that of the Ramirez eyewitness, where the distance, 
lighting, and viewing time were inconsistently described, and the 
gunman to be identified had concealed his face with a mask. 817 
P.2d at 782. 
3The trial court formally found that two witnesses to the 
assault viewed the assailant for five seconds and two seconds, 
respectively (R. 35). This contradicts the testimony of Rodney and 
Eddy Knowlden, who reported viewing times of seven to eight, and 
about ten seconds, respectively (R. 205-06, 230, 182). On appeal, 
defendant appears to accept Rodney's and Eddy's testimony over the 
trial court's finding. 
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(2) Degree of Attention. 
The second Ramirez factor is also far less problematic 
here. The Ramirez witness, while attempting to scrutinize the 
masked gunman, was under assault by another man wielding a pipe. 
817 P.2d at 783. Rodney Knowlden was burdened by no such 
distraction. He did notice "[p]eople everywhere" as he pursued 
the intruders (R. 227). However, once Haddenham was bludgeoned, 
Rodney's pursuit stopped, and his attention focused upon 
Haddenham's assailant (R. 230). 
(3) Capacity to Observe. 
Regarding this factor, defendant claims only that 
"Rodney had apparently been drinking" (Br. of Appellant at 26).6 
However, Rodney declared that he had drunk but one beer at the 
time he witnessed the assault (R. 247). The lead investigating 
officer, while he could smell alcohol about the witnesses, also 
reported that none of them appeared intoxicated (R. 273). 
Rodney Knowlden also described the assault and the 
scene in reasonable detail, belying any suggestion that his 
observational capacity was impaired (R. 237-41). Rodney reported 
that he has "perfect" eyesight (R. 231). Even though the episode 
must have been stressful, .cf. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783, Rodney 
himself was not injured in the attack. In short, "there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that [Rodney] was impaired by 
fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol." See id. 
6Rodney's showup identification of defendant (Br. of Appellant 
at 26) is irrelevant to the question of his capacity to observe the 
assault earlier. 
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(4) Spontaneous, Not the Product of Suggestion. 
The trial court found that "the police failed to obtain 
or maintain any permanent record regarding descriptions of the 
assailant prior to the time the 'showup' occurred" (R. 34, 
Addendum E to Br. of Appellant). This finding is clearly 
erroneous, for it is contrary to the clear weight of the 
evidence. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
It is quite true that the lead investigating officer, 
Mattfeld (R. 272), did not personally take a description of 
Haddenham's assailant before proceeding to defendant's home (R. 
263, 280). Instead, responding to the perceived urgency of the 
situation when he arrived at the Knowlden home, Officer Mattfeld 
"just got some statements to find out what happened" (R. 275). 
He then went to defendant's home, as directed by the excited 
witnesses (R. 262-63). 
However, upon defense counsel's cross-examination, 
Mattfeld specifically stated that he had the witnesses from the 
Knowlden home begin writing their own statements after he had 
gone into defendant's home, but before the showup (R. 275). Also 
upon cross-examination, and consistent with Officer Mattfeld, 
Rodney Knowlden testified that he completed his written statement 
before he viewed the showup (R. 233-34).7 No evidence 
7Trial defense counsel, who drafted the trial court's findings 
of fact, apparently overlooked or disregarded the specific 
testimony, elicited by his own cross-examination, that contradicts 
the finding in dispute here. The witness exclusion rule was in 
effect during the evidentiary hearing, so that Mattfeld and Rodney 
did not hear each other's testimony (R. 149-50). 
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contradicts this testimony (copied at Appendix II of this brief). 
See Linam v. King, 804 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Utah App. 1991) (finding 
was clearly erroneous where the only record evidence was contrary 
to it). Clearly, then, at least one description of Haddenham's 
assailant was obtained and maintained prior to the showup. 
Further, Rodney Knowlden's description remained 
reasonably consistent. His written statement (copied at Appendix 
I of this brief) described the assailant as "a [M]exican male, 
approx[i]mately, 5'6" tall 200 lbs. [with] a small beard on the 
end of his chin." Rodney varied from this only slightly at the 
hearing of the motion to suppress, describing the assailant as 
five feet, six inches tall, with black hair, and heavy-set—some 
180 to 190 pounds (R. 230). He also put the assailant in a 
light-colored, blood-spattered shirt (R. 238). The goatee-type 
beard was a consistent descriptive feature (R. 230, 242). 
Rodney Knowlden's description of the assailant is more 
consistent than the descriptions in Ramirez. Those descriptions 
varied among the several witnesses, and over time, in such 
distinctive particulars as whether the accused wore a hat, and in 
whether he was tattooed. 817 P.2d at 783-84. The only variance 
here lies in a ten- to twenty-pound difference in Rodney's 
estimate of the assailant's weight; however, his description 
remained one of a short, heavily-set individual. Further, Eddy 
Knowlden's description of a Hshort and stocky" assailant, also in 
a light-colored shirt (R. 183), is consistent with Rodney's 
description, albeit less detailed. 
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As just noted, Rodney Knowlden reported that the 
assailant's shirt was spattered with blood immediately after the 
assault (R. 238). This detail also supports the spontaneous 
nature of the description, for upon viewing the showup, Rodney 
Knowlden observed that defendant—whom he identified as the 
assailant—had changed his shirt (R. 231).8 This supports a 
determination that Rodney's ability to identify defendant from 
the assault was the product of his own observation, not of 
suggestion: were this not so, it seems unlikely that he would 
have noticed the shirt change at the showup. 
Further, even though at trial the State cannot 
introduce evidence that defendant was identified at the showup, 
that showup was not so suggestive as to require suppression of 
all identification testimony based upon earlier events. Again, 
Ramirez provides a striking contrast: There the defendant was 
the only person in the showup, and was handcuffed; the police who 
had apprehended him may have made suggestive comments to the 
witnesses. The supreme court characterized that showup as 
"blatantly suggestive.M 817 P.2d at 784. 
Here defendant was not handcuffed, and was arrayed with 
several other non-police in the showup (R. 268, 275). Even 
though some witnesses may have encouraged each other to identify 
8He testified that at the show-up, defendant wore "a darker 
shaded shirt. It was untucked. It hung down over his pants." 
This pretrial testimony about the show-up, even though not 
admissible at trial, may be considered in deciding whether 
testimony about the assault may be heard. See United States v. 
Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 472-73 n.18, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 1250-51 n.18 
(1980) (discussed more fully in Point Two of this brief). 
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defendant (R. 302, 313), there is no evidence that the police 
themselves gave such verbal encouragement• Indeed, the officers 
took the witnesses to the showup one person at a time, in an 
evident effort to reduce witness-to-witness suggestibility (R. 
302, 313; R. 201-02, 230, 269). Compare Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
777, 784 (three witnesses viewed robbery suspect together, from 
within police car). 
Further, the "suggestive circumstances" of the showup 
were caused in part by defendant himself: he attempted to hide 
behind the other showup subjects, and was admonished to cooperate 
(R. 185-86, 270, 301). All in all, then, even crediting the 
trial court's finding of "suggestive circumstances" here (R. 36), 
the police handling of this showup was a far cry from that in 
Ramirez. 
(5) Nature of the Event. 
Addressing the final Ramirez factor, this was clearly a 
traumatic event: Rodney Knowlden witnessed a potentially lethal 
ambush on his friend. Certainly Rodney could not provide a 
minutely exact description of the assailant, given these 
circumstances. However, contrary to defendant's argument (Br. of 
Appellant at 28), and as already set forth, he gave a reasonably 
detailed description of a rather distinctive-appearing assailant. 
That description has remained reasonably consistent, and ought 
not be barred from trial merely because he achieved it under 
frightening circumstances• 
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All in all, Rodney Knowlden's testimony here is far 
less problematic than that reviewed in Ramirez. Because the 
Ramirez eyewitness identification testimony was nevertheless 
deemed sufficiently reliable to be admitted, the State's 
proffered testimony of Rodney Knowlden in this case has been, 
surely, properly ruled admissible by the trial court. 
C. Eddy Knowlden's Testimony. 
(1) Opportunity to View. 
Eddy Knowlden was positioned six to thirteen feet from 
the assailant (Br. of Appellant at 21, R. 206).9 He saw Dale 
Haddenham fall, and saw the broken end of the bat that felled him 
flying through the air (R. 193-94). The area was lighted, 
allowing Eddy to observe the "short and stocky" assailant for 
some five to ten seconds (R. 182, 205-06). Again, this was far 
more reliable than the circumstances in Ramirez. 
(2) Degree of Attention. 
Defendant exaggerates Eddy Knowlden's distraction by 
the stranger who emerged from behind a tree just before Haddenham 
was bludgeoned. Eddy only saw this stranger "getting up" from 
behind the tree, with "something in their hands" (R. 177). He 
did not claim that this person "jumped at him with a bat in his 
hands," as defendant reports (Br. of Appellant at 22). Again, 
and obviously, Eddy was not distracted to nearly the degree of 
9Eddy's "apparent" preliminary hearing testimony that he was 
eighteen feet away (Br. of Appellant at 21), is unsupported by the 
record, for defendant has not incorporated the preliminary hearing 
transcript into the record on appeal. 
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the witness in Ramirez, who was himself under physical attack 
during the witnessed events. 
(3) Capacity to Observe. 
Eddy Knowlden is nearsighted and was not wearing his 
corrective lenses when Haddenham was assaulted. This may explain 
Eddy's failure to provide the same degree of detail in describing 
Haddenham's assailant as did Rodney Knowlden. Eddy stated that 
he had consumed no more than two beers prior to witnessing the 
assault (R. 216). Nothing suggests that Eddy's capacity to 
observe was otherwise impaired. 
Eddy did, however, readily identify defendant in the 
showup (R. 187), indicating that his observations at the assault 
scene were clear. This, in turn, is consistent with his 
statement that at six to eight feet—within his possible distance 
from the assailant at the scene—his eyesight is good (R. 186). 
Eddy's description of the assailant as "short and stocky," 
consistent with Rodney's description, appears to be reliable, 
even if less detailed. 
(4) Spontaneous, Not the Product of Suggestion. 
There is no evidence that Eddy's description of the 
assailant was the product of improper suggestion. Like Rodney 
Knowlden, Eddy believed that defendant, whom he picked from the 
showup, had changed his shirt after the assault (R. 187). Again, 
that showup was not "blatantly suggestive," as in Ramirez. 
Again, Eddy's failure to provide a more elaborate description 
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suggests that his description was not unfairly enhanced by the 
showup procedure, 
Eddy Knowlden's written witness statement (R. 202) has 
not found its way into the record on appeal. However, his 
testimony is not per se inadmissible on this basis. Nothing in 
Ramirez requires written or otherwise recorded pre-showup 
identifications. Further, as already noted, Eddy's rather close 
and fairly extended opportunity to observe the assailant, even if 
compromised somewhat by his nearsightedness, makes him a 
competent witness under Rule 602, Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
remedy for any shortcomings in Eddy's testimony lies in defense 
cross-examination at trial, not in outright suppression. 
(5) Nature of the Event. 
Again, this was a traumatic event. Again, the creation 
of extreme trauma while committing a crime does not create a due 
process right to exclude witnesses to the crime from testifying 
to the best of their ability. 
The record indicates that defendant is hispanic (R. 
25). The State can find no record reference to the Knowldens' 
race. Assuming, however, that Eddy Knowlden is white (cjE. Br. of 
Appellant at 25), the most distinctive feature of the assailant, 
noted by Eddy, appears to be his short and stocky build. 
Accordingly, as in Ramirez, 817 P,2d at 783, 784, it does not 
appear that Eddy's identification of the assailant is somehow 
biased or clouded by racial discrepancies. 
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As with Rodney Knowlden, Eddy Knowlden's eyewitness 
identification testimony is less troublesome than the testimony 
that was held, in Ramirez, to be adequately reliable. The trial 
court's decision to allow Eddy's testimony should be affirmed. 
D. Jodv Knowlden's Testimony. 
As set forth earlier, the record on appeal contains no 
testimony from Jody Knowlden. It appears that Jody was 
positioned to witness the assault on Haddenham, although from a 
greater distance than did Rodney and Eddy (R. 362). If he did 
witness the assault, and if he identifies the assailant 
consistently with Rodney and Eddy, it would appear that Jody, 
too, should be allowed to give his identification testimony. 
Because this case is still in a pretrial posture, the State 
should be permitted to lay this necessary foundation for Jody 
Knowlden's testimony in the trial court. Meanwhile, this Court 
should affirm the admissibility of the eyewitness identification 
testimony offered by Rodney and Eddy Knowlden. 
POINT TWO 
THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY WAS 
NOT IMPERMISSIBLY "TAINTED" BY POLICE 
MISCONDUCT THAT OCCURRED AFTER THE ASSAULT. 
Defendant next argues that the illegal entry into his 
home, upon which he was apprehended and placed in the showup, 
plus the suggestive circumstances of the showup, impermissibly 
"tainted" the witnesses' identification of him. The trial court 
suppressed the identification testimony from the showup itself. 
Defendant, however, argues that the court should have suppressed 
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even the testimony that identifies him only from the witnesses' 
observations of the assault upon Dale Haddenham. This argument 
should be rejected. 
A. Appellate Review of "Retroactive Taint" Theory. 
In effect, defendant argues that Rodney, Eddy, and Jody 
Knowldens' identification of the assailant, based upon their 
observations of the assault, is not independent of the subsequent 
police misconduct.10 Instead, he argues that the showup, made 
possible by the illegal police entry into his home, impermissibly 
enhanced, or "tainted," the Knowldens' prior memories of the 
assailant (Br. of Appellant at 33). 
Defendant cites no case where in-court identification 
testimony following a flawed, in-the-field showup has been 
suppressed under his argument, which may be characterized as one 
of "retroactive taint." The custodial "lineup" cases he cites, 
implicating the right to have counsel present during lineups (Br. 
of Appellant at 17), are not on-point. 
However, the United States Supreme Court has stated 
that suppression might, at times, be appropriate in the context 
of a showup that is associated with police misconduct. See 
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 472-73, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 
1250-51 (1980). The test for the admissibility of testimony that 
recounts pre-misconduct events is a variant of the familiar 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" or "attenuation" analysis, 
10Future reference to Rodney, Eddy, and Jody will be 
collectively to "the Knowldens," with the understanding that 
Dorothy Knowlden is not included within such reference. 
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traditionally applied to evidence obtained after police 
misconduct. Crews, 445 U.S. at 470-74 & n.19, 100 S. Ct. at 
1249-51 & n.19 (citing authorities). 
For eyewitness identification testimony to be 
attenuated from a possible "retroactive taint,M three elements 
must be satisfied: (1) the eyewitness must be present at trial 
to testify about the crime and the offender, and to identify the 
defendant as the offender; (2) the eyewitness must have knowledge 
of and the ability to reconstruct the crime and identify the 
offender that are independent of the police misconduct; (3) the 
defendant must be present in the courtroom, so that the witness 
can compare him or her to the appearance of the offender at the 
time of the crime. 445 U.S. at 471, 100 S. Ct. at 1250.u The 
second element is critical to this case: defendant argues that 
the Knowldens lack the ability, independent of the search and 
ensuing showup, to identify him as Haddenham's assailant. 
The trial court, briefed under Crews (R. 45, 71-82), 
rejected defendant's argument, implicitly determining that the 
Knowldens are able to identify Haddenham's assailant, based 
solely upon their contemporaneous observation of him during and 
immediately after the assault. In traditional attenuation 
analysis, Utah appellate courts grant no deference to trial court 
rulings. State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 26 (Utah 
11
 Crews dealt with a victim-witness, and its attenuation test 
refers to the "victim." The State discerns no difference between 
a victim-witness and a nonvictim-witness, for the purpose of the 
Crews analysis, and therefore refers to "eyewitness." 
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January 7, 1993). However, the "independent identification" 
element in issue here is a factual finding, by the trial court, 
that the in-court identification of the accused is uninfluenced 
by any improper pretrial identifications. Crews, 445 U.S. at 
473, 100 S. Ct. at 1251. Accord State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 
289, 292 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044, 103 S. Ct. 
1443 (1983). 
The "independent identification" finding must be 
supported by clear and convincing evidence. United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1939 (1967). 
Nevertheless, once made, the finding should receive the deference 
normally accorded to factual findings under Rule 52(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure—that is, it should be reversed only for 
clear error. This is entirely appropriate, for the trial court, 
to make such a finding, must necessarily assess the demeanor, and 
hence the credibility, of the challenged witnesses. This is 
quintessentially a trial court function. State v. Vigil, 815 
P.2d 1296, 1299 (Utah App. 1991). 
B. Identification Independent of, or Untainted by, 
the Police Misconduct. 
In this case, the trial court did not clearly err in 
finding that Rodney and Eddy Knowlden can independently identify 
defendant as Dale Haddenham's assailant. As set forth in Point 
One of this brief, the trial court's finding is supported by 
Rodney's and Eddy's rather detailed testimony, relating their 
close-range view of the assault and of the distinctive-appearing 
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assailant, still holding the broken bat, immediately after 
Haddenham was struck. 
Although the trial jury will not hear testimony about 
the showup, the fact that Rodney and Eddy promptly selected 
defendant from it, as the assailant, supports a finding that they 
had formed a clear mental image of him at the time of tne 
assault. See Crews, 445 U.S. at 472-73 & n.18, 100 S. Ct. at 
1250-51 & n.18 (considering identification at improper show-up, 
even though itself suppressed, as evidence that independent basis 
for identification existed). At the showup, both Rodney and Eddy 
recognized that defendant had apparently changed his shirt 
following the assault (R. 187, 231); this further supports a 
finding that they had a clear image of the assailant before, and 
independently of, the showup. Finally, while the record does not 
record defendant's height and weight, it seems safe to surmise 
that he does indeed resemble the short, stocky assailant 
described by Rodney and Eddy. 
Under Crews, see id., all the above factors support a 
finding that Rodney and Eddy Knowlden can, independently of the 
showup, identify defendant as Haddenham's assailant. A full 
competency foundation remains to be laid for the identification 
testimony of Jody Knowlden; subject to that caveat, his 
testimony, too, should be admissible. In sum, the Knowldens' 
eyewitness identification testimony, because it "neither resulted 
from nor was biased by" the improper police search and the 
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showup, 445 U.S. at 473, 100 S. Ct. at 1251, therefore may 
properly be heard at trial. 
C. Other Considerations Supporting Admission of the 
Eyewitness Identification Testimony. 
Several policy considerations also support the trial 
court's decision to allow the Knowldens' eyewitness 
identification testimony. For one thing, Rule 602, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, permits witnesses to testify about relevant matters of 
which they have personal knowledge. Defendant would sweep this 
general competency rule aside here, barring the Knowldens from 
testifying about the assault altogether, even though they clearly 
have personal knowledge of it, only because police officers 
committed error. The Knowldens, who are hardly responsible for 
the police error, should not be stripped of their right to 
testify because of it. 
Next, even though the police erred by entering 
defendant's home without a warrant and without consent, that 
error ought not labelled "flagrant," such that all evidence even 
indirectly associated with it should be suppressed. Cf. Thurman, 
203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21-22 ("flagrant" misconduct makes a 
stronger case for suppression). The officers responded too 
hastily to an excited crowd of witnesses, who directed them to 
defendant's home as the likely place where Haddenham's assailant 
would be found (R. 33, 262-63). This does not amount to a 
willful violation of constitutional rights; at most, negligence 
was present. The evidence directly obtained from the improper 
home entry has been legitimately suppressed. By asking to 
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suppress even testimonial witness evidence of events that were 
observed before the home entry, defendant is seeking a remedy 
that sweeps well beyond the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary 
rule. See Thurman, id. (attenuation analysis is tied to 
deterrent purpose of exclusionary rule). 
Defendant, quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 
240-41, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1939 (1967), complains of possible 
unfairness in the fact that, in order to impeach the Knowldens' 
independent, in-court identification testimony, he may himself 
have to reveal the "suggestive" showup that he has succeeded in 
suppressing. This is a tactical decision for defense counsel to 
make: the fact that the decision may be a hard one is no basis 
for relieving counsel from having to make it at all. 
Further, the question of "fairness" depends upon whose 
ox is being gored. The United States Constitution was 
established to, among other things, "establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, . . ., promote the general Welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity . 
. .." U.S. Const. Preamble. Accordingly, defendant's "fairness" 
argument is unduly one-sided. Under the constitution—which 
ought to protect the innocent as well as defendant—the Knowldens 
should be allowed to seek redress, at trial, for the violent 
disruption of their own tranquility and liberty. They offer 
testimony that, apparently powerfully, implicates defendant as 
the person who most violently disrupted their family gathering. 
They should be allowed to give that testimony. 
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Finally, it remains to be seen whether at trial, 
defendant will be convicted. Nearly three years have elapsed 
since the events in question. Defendant may be able to impeach 
the Knowldens' testimony sufficiently to raise a reasonable doubt 
about his guilt. To effectively bar trial altogether now, upon 
the dubious constitutional argument advanced by defendant, seems 
premature and unnecessary. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgment, 
allowing eyewitness identification testimony, stemming from 
observations that were made before any police misconduct 
occurred, should be affirmed. This Court should so order, and 
this case should proceed to trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ M day of March, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
J. «EVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX I 
Written Witness Statement of Rodney Knowlden 
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APPENDIX II 
Evidence that Written Witness Statements were Prepared 
Before the Showup: 
Testimony of Rodney Knowlden (R. 233-34) 
Testimony of Officer Mattfeld (R. 275-80) 
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MR. BRADSHAW: The lighting must be different 
from that side of the room. 
THE COURT: I agree. It does look black. 
MR. BRADSHAW: Could the record reflect that the 
defendants shirt is in fact black? 
THE COURT: I am not going to make that judgment. 
If you want to —• 
MR. BRADSHAW: I don't know. 
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the record 
that it's either black or dark blue? 
MR. BRADSHAW; You gave a written statement to 
the police? 
A Yes, sir, I did. 
Q Do you recall doing that? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q When was that in relationship to the showup when 
you were asked to identify the person who hit Mr. 
Haddenham? 
A That was in Eddy's house prior to the police 
ever taking any of us outside. 
$ It was before they asked you to give as much 
detail as you could about the person you had seen hit Mr. 
Haddenham? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that true? 
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A Yes, sir. 
Q And, in essence, the only detail you could 
provide—in fact, Your Bonor, I think we should probably 
make this part of the evidence. 
THE COURT: What is it? 
MR. BRADSHAW: It is the statement he filled out 
prior to the showup. Banding you what's been marked as 
defendant's exhibit 6, can you recognize that? 
A Yes, sir, I do. 
Q Is that the statement you gave to the police? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q That was filled out at the house prior to the 
showup? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q This is the statement in which you were asked to 
provide as much detail as you could about the person that 
had assaulted Mr. Baddenham? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And the description you gave was five six tall, 
two hundred pounds; is that true? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Small beard on the end of his chin; is that not 
also true? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Any other detail that you were able to give the 
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A I just got some statements to find out what 
happened. Then I talked to the fire department. 
Q All right. After you went in to the Gurule 
house, you then went back across the street and took 
statements from the individuals there? 
A Correct. 
Q And there are a series of written statements. 
Were those taken at that point in time? 
A They were started at that point in time. I went 
over there. I talked to them. I gave them statements to 
start on. Then I went back over to the Gurule house. 
Q And started setting up this lineup? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q This showup. There were four individuals as I 
understand it in the showup? 
A I believe so. I am not certain. 
Q Do you have a record as to who appeared in the 
showup? 
A No, sir. 
Q At the showup, were the individuals handcuffed? 
A No, sir. 
Q Are you sure of that? 
A I am positive. 
Q None of the participants, none of the suspects 
were handcuffed at that time? 
00275 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A No, sir. 
Q As I understand it while you were setting this 
up and getting the lights and getting the people standing 
where they needed to stand, the people who had been at the 
party across the street were all standing outside of their 
house? 
A They were inside and outside. 
Q All right. Many of them outside? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And they could clearly from where they were see 
you setting this up? 
A Wasn't too much to set up. I had them go 
outside and stand in a straight line. My idea was to 
basically use it is a screening process to see if I had the 
right people. 
Q My question was not with regard to your purpose 
but whether or not there were any obstructions, anything 
that would preclude them from seeing what you were doing? 
A No, not unless they were to — 
Q You went over and asked some of these 
individuals to come back and attempt to identify the person 
who had assaulted Dale Baddenham? 
A Yes. 
Q And as I understand it, you asked them to come 
over one at a time? 
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A Yes, sir. 
Q After they would make their identification, was 
there anything to keep them from talking to anybody about 
which one they had picked or anything like that? 
A I had them on one side of the street where 
Officer Accocks was. I would bring one forward. I would 
talk to them, then I would send them across the street to 
another car so — I asked them to specifically not to talk. 
Q All right. As I understand it, let me ask you 
this first, how many people who were at that party 
indicated to you that they might — that they saw the 
person assault Dale Baddenham? 
A I don't recall. I only recall one. 
Q I am not asking you how many identified. I am 
asking how many people did you have attempt to identify? 
In other words, people who said, "I saw it, let me see if I 
can pick them out." 
A I didn't write their names down. 
Q Do you have a recollection it was like three or 
four people, something like that? 
A Four to six people. 
Q Four to six people that you escorted across the 
street and said can you tell me who was the person they saw 
assault Mr. Haddenham? 
A I asked them who was in the house and who 
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assaulted Mr. Haddenham. 
Q There was only one person that looked at the 
lineup and said Mr. Gurule is the one that assaulted Dale 
Haddenham. 
A I can only recall one. 
Q The others were not able to make an 
identification or indicate that the person that they had 
seen assault him wasn't in the lineup? 
A I cannot say whether they identified him or not. 
I didn't put it in my report. I just don't recall. 
Q But your independent recollection that of the 
four to six people, there was only one that made a positive 
identification of the defendant, Mr. Gurule? 
A As actually assaulting, yes. 
Q Others indicated that in fact Mr. Gurule was in 
the house but was not the one that assaulted Mr. Haddenham? 
A They identified him as being in the house but 
they did not say, no, he is not the one, he is not the one. 
I don't recall who said they saw him assault and who 
didn't. 
Q Okay. And I want this to be very clear. In 
terms of people who could positively say Mr. Gurule was the 
person that assaulted Dale Haddenham, there was only one 
that you can recall? 
A Correct. 
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Q But there are others that say that Mr. Gurule 
was inside the house? 
A Correct. 
Q But could not offer a positive identification in 
terms of assaulting Mr. Haddenham? 
A I don't recall whether they did or not. 
Q But your recollection is they could not or did 
not? 
A No, I don't recall whether they could or 
couldn't is what I am trying to say. 
Q Your specific recollection is that only one 
could make a positive identification? 
A That's all I can recall, yes. 
Q In point of fact there were at least two that 
specifically said Mr. Gurule was the one that went into the 
house and tore the fingernail off Mrs. Knowlden, Dorothy 
Knowlden and was the person that slammed the door into 
Dorothy Knowlden, scaring her and making her almost fall 
down? 
A Correct. 
Q Two people specifically identified Richard 
Gurule as that person? 
A I didn't write down the names, like I say. 
Q And I didn't ask you for their name. 
But there were at least two? 
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A There were at least two. 
Q That said he was the person in the house that 
assaulted Dorothy Knowlden? 
A Yes. 
Q The person that Dale Haddenham was chasing at 
the time he was hit? 
A It was my understanding he wasn't chasing at the 
time. It's my understanding that he ran outside and was 
walking down along the driveway. 
Q All right. Prior to conducting the lineup or 
showup in this case, did you ask the witnesses to give you 
a physical description of the person that they had seen 
assault Mr. Haddenham? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And did you record in some way the physical 
description that each of these individuals gave to you? 
A I didn't put it in my report. 
Q Did you, as officer in charge—is there a report 
anywhere that records the physical description, 
characteristics that these witnesses described in regards 
to the assailant of the Dale Haddenham? 
A No, sir. 
Q Do you have any independent recollection of what 
they told you? 
A No, sir. 
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